

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 4 June 1962, at 10 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K.K. RAO  
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. B.P. KRASOULIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. EL ERIAN

Mr. M.S. AHMED

Mr. G. EL ABD

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. V. BAKER

Mr. D. MARK

Mr. R.G. STURGILL

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the forty-eighth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My colleagues will recall that at the end of our last meeting we had three speakers left on the list, namely the representatives of Romania, Poland and the United Kingdom. Since then, the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States and the Soviet Union have asked to speak; but I understand that, by arrangement between Romania and the Soviet Union, Romania has agreed to cede its position to that of the Soviet Union. That being the case, I have pleasure in calling upon the Soviet representative to speak first.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to thank the representative of Romania for yielding me his place on the list of speakers. This enables me to read out on behalf of the Soviet delegation the Soviet Government's statement of 3 June 1962 on the United States high-altitude nuclear explosions. We consider it necessary to read out the text of this statement because of its great importance and because this question is on the agenda of our Conference. The three-Power Sub-Committee has been discussing it specially for a long time; it has also been discussed in the plenary Committee, and it is connected with the whole range of disarmament problems.

I shall read out the text of the statement by the Soviet Government dated 3 June 1962 on the United States high-altitude nuclear explosions:

"The United States Government has announced that, in the course of the series of nuclear weapon tests which it is now conducting in the Pacific, it is planned to carry out nuclear explosions, including megaton explosions, at an altitude of several hundred kilometres.

"In connexion with the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States, the Soviet Government has already declared that by undertaking such operations the United States Government is perpetrating an aggressive act, starting a new round in the nuclear armaments race and dealing a severe blow to the hopes of the nations for the strengthening of peace and disarmament. At the present time the Soviet Government deems it necessary to draw the attention of all governments and peoples to the United States' intention to undertake now and extremely dangerous operations which, by extending the nuclear armaments race to outer space, will infringe still further upon the interests of all mankind.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"The high-altitude nuclear weapon tests being carried out by the United States of America can have extremely harmful consequences - the disturbance of the upper conducting layers of the earth's atmosphere over vast areas, the appearance of radio-wave absorption areas and the appearance of a new radiation zone in space immediately surrounding the earth. What will be the result of all this?

"The disturbance of the ionosphere and the appearance of absorption areas can result in a temporary breakdown of radio communications over wide areas, the duration of which cannot be predicted with certainty at the present time.

"A prolonged interruption of radio communications may disturb normal life in many parts of the world and in particular create serious difficulties for sea and air transport in the Pacific region. The consequences of the high-altitude nuclear explosions by the United States may be even more serious for the astronaut heroes of our time, the pioneers of mankind's penetration into space. If a space ship is within a few hundred kilometres of the centre of an explosion at the time of its occurrence, the astronaut will receive a dose of radiation considerably above the lethal level, quite apart from the fact that he may be blinded by the radiation or light; if the astronaut is in the new radiation zone that will come into being as a result of the United States megaton nuclear explosions, he will receive an extremely high dose of radiation.

"The condition of the space immediately surrounding the earth will require exhaustive investigation from the standpoint of radiation danger before it will be possible for flights by astronauts to be resumed and for further advances to be made in man's penetration into space.

"It should also be pointed out that high-yield nuclear explosions at high altitudes may have a number of serious consequences. The conditions of life on earth are determined by a number of processes occurring in the upper layers of the atmosphere, and a disturbance of the balance in these layers will inevitably be accompanied by long-lasting new phenomena on the earth the nature of which it is difficult to foresee, in particular, by weather changes that may have deleterious consequences.

"All this makes it abundantly clear that the conducting of high-altitude nuclear tests by the United States Government affects the interest of all States, may directly influence the lives of large numbers of human beings and puts considerable difficulties in the way of the further study and conquest of space.

"Undoubtedly the United States Government is well aware of this. It is also aware that prominent scientists in many countries are at present protesting against its intention of setting off high-altitude nuclear explosions, realizing what destructive natural forces deleterious to mankind may be set in motion as a result of such explosions.

"It was reported in the world Press that on 22 May a special warning against the conducting of high-altitude nuclear tests was addressed to the President of the United States by a group of prominent United States scientists, including Dr. Szent Györgyi, a Nobel prize-winner for medicine, Dr. Shapley, the celebrated astronomer, Dr. Livingston, Professor of Physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dr. Mather, Professor of Geology at Harvard University and one-time President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

"These world-famous United States scientists, being profoundly disturbed by the plans of the United States Government, pointed out in their appeal that the space immediately surrounding the earth is not a suitable area for potentially destructive experiments and that no individual or country has a right to upset the balance of nature.

"An English scientist of world-wide repute, Sir Bernard Lovell, the director of the Jodrell Bank Observatory, has made a number of statements against the conducting of high-altitude nuclear tests by the United States. He has urged that steps should be taken to prevent the execution of these projects, which he described as outrages to the civilized world.

"The International Astronomical Union, an association of astronomers and astrophysicists from all over the world, recently adopted a special resolution declaring that no one has a right to bring about any appreciable change in the earth's environment without international agreement and without a thorough international study of the question, and that any interference in future with the progress of astronomical research may have serious moral and material consequences.

"Nevertheless, the United States Government is not only refusing to renounce its intention to conduct high-altitude nuclear tests, but has also recently again confirmed that these tests, which have an important place in United States plans for perfecting nuclear weapons, are to be carried out in the very near future.

"Thus the nations have fresh confirmation of the fact that, in its policy of preparing for a nuclear war, the United States Government does not stop short and has no intention of stopping short at a gross violation of the most elementary

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rules of international law which require States to act in international affairs with respect for the legitimate interests of all other States, or at openly setting at defiance the security and welfare of the nations.

"How cynical are the candid statements made by responsible organs of the United States Government that one of the purposes of the impending high-altitude nuclear tests will be to determine how communications systems and radar installations can be put out of action by means of such explosions. This is tantamount to an admission that the United States of America is making an advance search for means of paralyzing the defences of peace-loving States so as to make itself safe from nuclear retaliation. The recent statement by the President of the United States that in certain circumstances the United States might take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union should be recalled in this connexion.

"Nor can one overlook the fact that the United States Government is preparing to carry out high-altitude nuclear tests - in the space immediately surrounding the earth - at the very time when negotiations on co-operation in the peaceful utilization of outer space are taking place between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus the United States Government is paying lip-service to co-operation, to joint action with the USSR for speeding up the conquest of outer space in the interests of all mankind. But what are its deeds? In reality the United States Government is at present extending the nuclear arms race to outer space, disregarding the fact that this is putting fresh obstacles in the way of the investigation and conquest of outer space and may even endanger the life and safety of astronauts.

"It is to be regretted that, in the matter of co-operation in the peaceful utilization of outer space, the words of the United States Government are at variance with its deeds.

"The question arises, what justification does the United States Government have for proposing to conduct high-altitude nuclear tests which seriously affect the interests of all States, without so much as asking their views on the subject?

"Of course, the United States Government has and can have no justification or right to take such action. The time is long since past when the imperialist Powers could base their conduct in international affairs on the principle that might is right. An entirely new correlation of forces has now arisen in the world; any aggressive actions that endanger peace, by whatever side they may be



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perpetrated, are now resolutely condemned by the peace-loving States, which are fully equipped to stand up for their own interests - a fact which no one should forget.

"If the United States Government puts its intentions into effect and sets off the high-altitude nuclear explosions it has planned, it will bear the full responsibility for seriously complicating the international situation. The United States measures for extending military preparations to the space immediately surrounding the earth will oblige the Soviet Union to take the steps which the circumstances require to safeguard its own security and the security of the socialist countries and of all peace-loving countries. Only the short-sighted can believe that the United States of America will derive any military advantages from conducting high-altitude nuclear tests. The Government of the USSR will see to it that this does not happen.

"The Soviet Union has already strongly protested, and now protests, against an intensification of the nuclear arms race. In accordance with the interests of the Soviet people, the Government of the USSR is consistently striving to strengthen peace, to secure the speediest possible solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and to promote the development of international co-operation in every possible way. It accordingly appeals to the Government of the United States to heed the legitimate demands of the peoples, and in the interests of all mankind to refrain from setting off high-altitude nuclear explosions, choosing instead the path of reaching agreement to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests for all times."

The Soviet delegation requests that the text of this statement be issued as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>(1)</sup>

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I have been notified that our United States colleague wishes, on a point of order, to make a very brief reply to that statement. Therefore, if there is no objection from the representative who should have spoken next, I will call upon the representative of the United States at this point.

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(1) ENDC/43.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The statement read into our record just now by the Soviet representative is a statement of the Government of the Soviet Union addressed, as I understand it, to the Government of the United States. My government will, of course, consider this statement; will determine whether a reply is warranted; and, if so, will make such reply as is appropriate.

I will merely say now that a protest against what is described by the Soviet Government as a blow against peace and disarmament is a clearly hypocritical and cynical statement, coming as it does from a government which, in repudiation of its freely-pledged word, unilaterally resumed nuclear weapon tests last autumn and thereby bears complete and sole responsibility for the consequences.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): Today I wish to deal with the problem we discussed last Friday. The Polish delegation has made a careful study of the working draft of Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the co-Chairmen (ENDC/40/Rev.1). We are glad to note that, following the working draft of the preamble, a second step forward has been taken towards framing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The document shows that certain important provisions of the treaty have been agreed and that there is agreement on the content of Part I, in that it should contain provisions on the elimination of armed forces and armaments, on control and on the maintenance of international peace and security. This is in line with the conception of the draft treaty submitted to our Conference by the delegation of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2).

It must be pointed out, however, that the document before us reflects a whole series of basic differences which have arisen on how the task assigned to us is to be accomplished. It may be said that the words between single and double brackets constitute, as it were, a quintessence of the differences separating the Soviet Union and the socialist States on the one side, and the United States and its allies on the other side, on essential questions connected with carrying out general and complete disarmament.

I do not intend to dwell on all these differences. They were discussed last Friday. But I wish to make a few comments on some of them.

The wording of article 1, paragraph 2 (b) proposed by the Soviet delegation provides for an absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons, whereas the wording proposed by the United States, apart from the agreed formula on the elimination of stockpiles, only provides for prohibition of the manufacture of those weapons. It might be argued

that this is more of a semantic difference than a practical one. It is evident, however, that these formulas reflect the difference in fundamental approach to the problem of nuclear weapons in general. That difference is shown by the whole structure of the United States plan, which is based on retention of the nuclear weapon; it is also shown by the fact that the United States is unwilling to agree to the exclusion of nuclear weapons, in article 3, paragraph 3, from the armaments of the forces made available to the United Nations.

Mr. Dean, the United States representative, said last Friday (ENDC/PV.47, p.19-20) that it would be premature to determine the type of armament of the United Nations forces now. In other words, he wants the question of equipping those forces with nuclear weapons to be left open. But we do not think that question can be left in abeyance. It is a question of principle. Our opinion was, and still is, that the nuclear weapon differs in quality from any other weapon. It is the most destructive of all weapons of mass destruction, and should be strictly prohibited. It is impossible to reconcile the idea of general and complete disarmament with that of retaining nuclear weapons. This opinion is shared by most of the Members of the United Nations, which at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961 adopted a declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)). We think that the view that the use of nuclear weapons might be justified by the need to defend the principles of the United Nations Charter is in conflict with the conscience of mankind.

In his reply last Friday the United States representative again attempted to convince us that his country envisages the prohibition of nuclear weapons. But if that is so, why does the United States so persistently oppose the formula proposed by the Soviet delegation?

In the opinion of the Polish delegation, confirmation of the United Nations declaration in article 1 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament would have considerable moral and political significance. The Polish delegation considers that our Conference should come out clearly and unequivocally against the use of nuclear weapons and make their prohibition one of the fundamental principles of the future treaty on general and complete disarmament. That explains the necessity of including the formula on the general prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

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In connexion with the problem I have been discussing, I consider it necessary fully to endorse the statement by the Soviet Government which Mr. Zorin read to us at the beginning of this meeting. The high-altitude nuclear tests which the United States is going to carry out are a serious blow to the hopes of the peoples, who are asking for the discontinuance of all nuclear tests. Such tests can only increase tension and intensify the nuclear arms race, not to mention the danger to meteorology and communications.

I should like now to comment briefly on the differences between the Soviet and the American wording for article 1, paragraph 5. According to the text proposed by the Soviet delegation, the transition from one stage to the next would depend on a decision of the international disarmament organization confirming that all the disarmament measures provided for and all the necessary verification measures had been carried out. The text proposed by the United States delegation, on the other hand, implies that the decision on the transition to the following stage would not depend on the IDO alone, and would not be based solely on the findings concerning disarmament and verification. According to that text, the decision might depend on certain other bodies and, as we know from the discussion on the other provisions of the treaty, on the veto of the permanent members of the Control Council and the Security Council, and also on the fulfilment of a series of political conditions.

In this United States approach to the problem, the Polish delegation sees a serious danger to the effective implementation of general and complete disarmament. It affords a possibility of prolonging the disarmament process ad infinitum, and the parties are deprived of the certainty that the process will be carried out continuously in accordance with paragraph 4 of the principles agreed last September (ENDC/5).

Lastly, I should like to give my views on the wording for article 3. The United States delegation agrees, it is true, that article 3, paragraph 1 should refer to the principles of the United Nations Charter. In paragraph 2 of the article, however, we can already see an attempt by the United States delegation to depart from those principles. What other explanation could there be of the refusal of the United States delegation to accept the formula proposed by the Soviet delegation, according to which international disputes would be settled by peaceful means in accordance with appropriate procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter? Does the United States delegation consider that the procedure for settling international disputes laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter is inadequate? Article 33, quoted by Mr. Dean in his last statement, is in fact drafted in such general terms as to allow of every possible variant of procedure for the pacific settlement of disputes. I say, "pacific settlement", of course.

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How, then, can it be said that the Soviet text, which refers to the procedure provided for by the Charter, is restrictive?

It is clear that, behind this fear of a so-called restriction of the procedure, there lies concealed the wish to escape from the rules of the Charter which are no doubt an embarrassment to the United States. I must also point out that the attitude of the United States delegation which rejects the provisions of article 3, paragraph 2, relating to peaceful and friendly co-existence and co-operation is singularly eloquent. Is this United States attitude an attempt to deny the fundamental truth of today that the ideological differences which divide the world cannot be settled by war, and that peaceful coexistence is an objective necessity of our time? It is only on the basis of peaceful coexistence that we can create favourable conditions for carrying out general and complete disarmament.

The Polish delegation considers that the words between single and double brackets do not reflect semantic differences at all. They show basic differences, the elimination of which will determine the future progress of our work on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom is next on the list of speakers. I apologise for inflicting myself on my colleagues while I am in the Chair. I had intended to speak last Friday, but unfortunately there was not time.

First, I should like to make one comment on the statement which the representative of the Soviet Union read out to us this morning. I do not wish to go into this at length. I would only say that this of course is a direct result -- in whatever way one may view it -- of the steps which the Soviet Union took last autumn. It chose to resume the testing of nuclear devices and any developments that have flowed from that are a direct result of its action then. These things cannot be dealt with in isolation. Once a momentum is started again, it can go in all sorts of ways. It is quite clear that this is where the difficulty lay; this is where the error lay. It was therefore singularly inappropriate for our Soviet colleague to bring this matter forward this morning. I say that quite categorically.

I would just add that, even after the Soviet Union had resumed testing, it could have had, and it can still have, a test-ban treaty which would come into effect at once, if it would only rid itself of this obsession in regard to espionage, which has been shown quite clearly in relation to this particular subject to be wholly illusory. I am only sorry that the Soviet Union has not been willing to come to an agreement which would have obviated all tests in all environments by all nations. That is all I wish to say in relation to that matter.

I had hoped on Friday to make one or two comments about the very interesting speech made to us on that day by the representative of India, and I should like to come back to that now. The representative of India always adds to the interest of our debates. Sometimes he makes us think -- it is a painful process, but we all have to indulge in that sometimes. He put forward on Friday one or two proposals, very interesting in themselves and deserving of very careful thought. In the earlier part of his speech he talked in particular about the various types of verification, and he pointed out that three categories had been suggested. He spelled them out as follows:

"First, we have talked about verification of arms and so on which are destroyed... Secondly, we have talked about verification of retained arms. Thirdly, we have talked about verification to assure us that there are no arms hidden 'under the jacket'..." (ENDC/PV.47, page 7)

Then he went on to argue that in fact the second category was really not a category at all, and that the first and third categories were in any case the predominant ones. He said:

"So far as the second category... is concerned, that is, verification of retained arms, having listened very seriously and carefully to the discussions I am bound to say that the position in this matter is not clear to me." (ibid., p. 8)

He went on to point out where the real difficulties lie in regard to verification. He made the interesting point that a retained armament, legally and lawfully retained, is a perfectly proper thing to have during the disarmament process. I do not think any of us would disagree with that for one moment. But he drew from that the interesting conclusion that there are only two genuine categories to worry about. He said:

"It seems pretty clear to me that the problem is not one of retained arms, it is that of concealed, hidden, unlawfully retained, unlawfully built-up arms; that is a different matter from checking lawfully-retained arms." (ibid., page 2).

I think I would agree with him to the extent that any arms that are destroyed are one category on their own. No delegation in this room has any difficulty, as I understand it, about that. Those are the arms that go on the bonfire. Everything else can therefore be said to come into another category, the category of armaments that do not go on the bonfire. Some representatives have chosen to split the category into two. It is those two sub-headings of the one category that are the

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point. There are the clandestine arms hidden away in all sorts of places, but there can also be the clandestine arms hidden within the retained forces.

I will agree with the representative of India to the extent that they are all clandestine arms. Therefore he has made his point that there are two categories -- so long as one is clear that the second category has two sub-headings, if I may put it in that way. The important thing, as far as I am concerned, is that I cannot go along with him when he said that the question of checking retained arms is not so important, because this seems to me to be one essential aspect of this problem. I do not want to over-emphasize it here; I merely want it to be clear that so far as I am concerned, I accept his argument part of the way, but I do not go the whole way with him in this regard. What really matters, in so far as we are all concerned, is that some effective means should be found for ascertaining that clandestine arms do not exist. How one does it is a matter on which we from the West have put forward various suggestions, but we are still waiting for effective suggestions to come from our Soviet colleagues in this regard.

Then the representative of India referred to my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, and said that he had not mentioned inspection of production (ENDC/PV.47, p.10). I think it is clear that actual clandestine production would be covered automatically by any arrangements on verification of clandestine arms. I would have thought it came within the category. I think the fact that Sir Michael Wright did not specifically mention this on 28 May does not have any particular significance, because he was seeking to categorize and he was including all the clandestine arms in this way.

I am glad the representative of India raised this point, because it is an extremely important one, and I was glad to hear what he had to say in regard to it. I would only point out for the record that in fact the United Kingdom was one of the first to draw attention to this particular problem, because my colleague, Lord Home, speaking here on 27 March, said:

"I think a lot depends on what is written into the Soviet plan as to the function of the international disarmament organization. When does the international organization, for instance, come into a factory? And how far and at what point can it check the turnover from military production to civilian production? Very much will depend on the answer to that question when we come to study the subject of verification in

relation to general disarmament, because clearly we must be certain that if we destroy arms they will not be replaced..." (ENDC/PV.10, page 30)

That is what Lord Home said on 27 March, and I am glad to reassure the representative of India that the United Kingdom is with him in this regard, and has been for some time. I think the position here is clear. This is an important matter. The representative of India was quite right to draw our attention to it, and we think very much on the same lines in regard to the importance of it.

Another point the representative of India raised was in regard to what has come to be known in our Conference, in the jargon we pick up, as "maintaining the mix". At last Friday's meeting, Mr. Lall referred (ENDC/PV.47, p.11-12) to four different categories in which he claims that the United States plan does not maintain the mix. The four categories to which he referred are: the reduction of nuclear weapons themselves; the reduction of chemical and biological weapons; the reduction of certain conventional weapons which are specified in stage II of the plan but not in stage I; and lastly the reduction of small arms.

Now, Mr. Lall attached great importance to the first two but did not develop the third and the fourth. I think he would probably agree with me that these matters are not of such great significance. I recall that our United States colleague -- at one of our informal meetings, I think -- said that as far as these points were concerned the United States was quite willing to consider any aspect. So I think that for the point of the argument the third and fourth categories are not material; they help to build up Mr. Lall's shopping list, but no more. It is the first and second categories that are important -- and they are very important; that I freely admit. Mr. Lall said:

"Will it not change the present pattern or mix, and change it rather heavily, in favour of weapons of mass destruction?" (ENDC/PV.47, p.12).

That was what Mr. Lall said to us clearly in relation to the first two categories. He developed this argument in some detail, and came to the conclusion that there is at the very least a continuing potential of a changed mix or pattern in favour of these dreadful weapons.

Now I would say to him that, so far as the nuclear weapons are concerned, I do not follow him all the way in his argument. I would submit that in fact the United States proposals do not do this in regard to the nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon system comprises two parts -- the delivery vehicle and the warhead -- and I have argued in the past that nuclear warheads remaining after the complete elimination



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of delivery vehicles could be decisive, even if carried by very primitive or unorthodox means. But I would submit to my colleagues that this argument is valid only in conditions in which both sides have discarded all their orthodox weapons vehicles. As long as orthodox nuclear weapons vehicles remain, the percentage of them which is destroyed is, in my opinion, an effective measure of the diminution of nuclear striking power.

I think it is clear, if one contemplates it for a moment, that in fact these highly efficient nuclear weapons vehicles, which are held on both sides, obviously dominate the strategic position, and as long as they are retained, even in reduced quantities, it is they which really matter. Certainly I do not think anyone envisages that, if there were -- heaven forbid it -- a nuclear war, one could have a sort of shuttle service, going back and fetching the extra bombs at regular intervals. I do not think that that is at all how anyone envisages nuclear war. Therefore it is the nuclear weapons vehicles which, while they still exist, determine the relative level of strength. Once they are all eliminated, this argument is of course completely invalidated, and any type of improvised delivery vehicle would have very much greater importance. But as long as they are there, I would say that they dominate the position in this regard. The 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage is, I would have thought, the measure of the reduction in the nuclear war potential in that stage. Therefore I do not accept the interesting argument of the representative of India in this regard, for the reasons which I have given here.

I turn now to the chemical and biological weapons. The United States plan (ENDC/30) proposes a 50 per cent reduction in the second stage. There I think Mr. Lall has a point. I quite agree that the exact or comparable reduction is not suggested throughout the three stages. I think that he has made a fair point when he says that the mix is not entirely maintained in that particular regard. That is one of his four categories which I am giving him. But why is the mix altered in this case? I have said several times to my colleagues round this table that I am not myself inflexibly opposed to some variation of the mix. I have made that quite clear. However I believe that, by and large, the mix should be retained across the board during the disarmament process, and that basically such an approach should maintain the balance more easily than any other approach is likely to do.

I have also said that those who propose to change the mix have a duty to say why they propose this, to show that their proposals maintain the balance and to show that they have adequate verification measures in mind for what they propose. I would submit, in this case, that in this particular category the chemical, biological and radiological weapons have been left out, and that the mix has been changed here for a very good reason: that nobody has yet shown effective ways for policing and monitoring their reduction during the early stages. The United States plan of course does provide for studies in this regard in the first stage, and so far as I am aware our Soviet colleagues have not said that they are opposed to such studies, both in this regard and in respect of nuclear weapons. These are the two most difficult matters in this field. Therefore, if the United States plan provides in this way for a change in the mix in regard to chemical, biological and radiological weapons, it is for the very good reason that no one has yet shown an adequate way of effectively verifying reductions, at any rate in the first stage. The hope is that the proposed studies will produce an answer. But I would imagine that if anyone could propose a really clear and effective way of verifying and policing this very difficult aspect in the first stage, I would guess -- of course I do not know because I have not asked them -- that my United States colleagues would probably be very willing to make amendments to get the mix corrected and adjusted so that it would be uniform throughout.

However, as I understood Mr. Lall, he in fact was not seeking to do that: he was seeking to adduce arguments in the reverse direction, to show that it was proper and right, and that everybody agreed, that one should change the mix. Therefore I imagine that this is not exactly the sort of argument which is helping him in that regard. I am sorry if that is so, but I thought it right to bring the position out as I saw it.

I would remind the representative of India that what must be basic to any thinking on nuclear matters, or on chemical and biological ones, is that our present knowledge does not permit us to say that we know how to find all hidden warheads or all chemical weapons: but if a way of finding them could be discovered and brought to our notice, undoubtedly we could give further thought to this.

I think it is sometimes wise to acknowledge the existence -- as is the case here -- of very unpalatable facts, including the fact that it is extremely difficult to find an adequate way of verifying reductions in these two very dangerous forms of weapons. If we do not recognize this, there is a danger of our making proposals,

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particularly in regard to verification, which could be rendered nugatory as soon as any attempt were made to put them into practice. Thus one comes back to the hard realism of all this and the difficulties that are encountered in regard to it.

I am sorry to have taken so long in dealing with these particular points made by the representative of India, but they were so extremely important that I thought they deserved very careful consideration from us all. We shall all look forward with interest to his further thoughts on these two particular matters which I have been dealing with, and I know we will study them with care and interest.

I would just make one other reference to the comments which he made on Friday when he referred specifically, at a later stage in his speech, to the question of the concealment of nuclear weapons. Mr. Lall said:

"What I am going to suggest ..., in order to enable all the members of the Committee to appreciate this issue fully, is this: would it not be possible for those of the countries around this table which have already made studies about this matter to circulate to the other countries or to circulate as Conference papers summaries of the work they have done...?" (ENDC/PV.47, page 15)

Then he referred to the suggestion which I had made in this regard.

As Mr. Lall said, I have previously stated that we have made careful and detailed studies on verification, and we are continuing this work. I have also said that the results are formidable and that many of them are highly technical. It is for this reason that we have advocated working groups of those who can prepare for us the considered opinions needed: and in such groups we are prepared to play our full part and to make what contribution we can. We are very ready to contribute this information and to play our full part, but we do think that the appropriate forum for such a task would be working groups set up by the Conference. That is my response to what the representative of India has said in this regard. I think that that is really the best way to handle any papers of this sort; these highly technical matters could most usefully be dealt with in that way.

Now I should like to say just a few words about the matter submitted to us by our United States and Soviet colleagues on Friday, namely the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty (ENDC/40/Rev.1). I do not want to say a great deal about it because I think that this, after all, only pinpoints a number of the features of difference which have emerged in recent weeks, indeed months, during our discussions, and many of these points have been very adequately ventilated already. I therefore want to make only one or two comments.

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My first must be on the form in which this was presented to us. I have made comments on this in the past, but I thought that on Friday the difference in approach between our United States and Soviet colleagues was so abundantly clear. Just to remind my colleagues, I will re-quote the last two sentences of what Mr. Dean said to us then:

"... I want to thank my co-Chairman for his patience and for all the time he has given to this matter. As I say, I believe there has been honest give-and-take in this matter. We have shared our thinking and our views with each other, and we now put them before the Committee for examination." (ENDC/PV.47, p.28)

That is the sort of approach which I think is helpful in regard to the atmosphere we want in this Conference, and helpful in trying to make progress.

I only wish I could say the same about our Soviet colleague's speech on the same morning. On a previous occasion I referred to what I called the tone of his speech, and I think he misunderstood me a little. It was certainly not his speaking voice to which I was referring -- I am always charmed by that tone whenever I listen to it. What I was referring to was the tone of his comments on a previous occasion. Possibly when translated into Russian it sounds rather different, but it is the way in which he approaches the problem which at times saddens me. When I looked through his speech on Friday to check my first reactions I found no less than five occasions when he was openly doubting the motives of the United States delegation. It is one thing to challenge the arguments of another side and to seek to adduce better arguments, but it is another matter to challenge the motives. I do wish that all of us around this table could try -- perhaps at times I myself sin a little -- to consider that those with whom we are negotiating are doing so in good faith. I therefore regret that our Soviet colleague sought on so many occasions in his speech to say that the United States delegation was manoeuvring, or that its motives were not pure and that it was not serious in its desires. I like to hope and believe that we are all serious in our endeavours. I leave the point there.

As regards the substance of the matters, some of the points on which there is difference will quite clearly solve themselves as we proceed, if and when we get our final draft. For instance, on the point of difference at the very beginning, where there is a Soviet reservation -- the Soviet Union wishes to say that the States parties to the treaty "solemnly undertake" -- quite clearly, if and when we agreed our articles and had "solemnly undertaken", there would be no difficulty about words

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of that nature. The point is that at this present time certainly we have not "solemnly undertaken". At any rate, some words carrying one forward into the text proper could undoubtedly be devised, although the introductory articles in themselves cannot commit States. I think it was our Brazilian colleague who made this clear at one stage. Therefore I should have thought that this was certainly not a point of any great substance to worry about at this stage. Indeed, I think we should probably not seek to amend this document further on all these matters at this stage; it can be put on one side. It does show the points of agreement and the points of difference quite clearly.

I should first like to say a word on article 1, paragraph 2(a), where we speak of the disbanding of all armed forces and the dismantling of military establishments. The United States suggestion was to include "bases wherever they might be located." The Soviet Union does not like that, presumably because it wishes to include paragraph 2(d) providing for the dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases. On this I thought our Soviet colleague was making very heavy weather indeed in his comments on Friday. It seems to me that these preliminary articles to cover the whole treaty envisage the process over the whole field, and obviously at the end of the period all bases, whether foreign or any other kind, will have been destroyed. That is quite clear, whichever plan is taken. Therefore, it seems to me, as I have said before when we first discussed this article, that there is no justification for singling out foreign military bases.

And when our Soviet colleague tried to pretend that the United States draft did not fully cover the point, I thought he made a very poor effort. He said:

"The refusal of United States to accept this sub-paragraph can only be ascribed to its reluctance to agree really to dismantle military bases in foreign territories." (ENDC/PV.47, page 34)

There is one of those aspects of doubting the motives of the United States. Further on he said:

"These bases are situated thousands of miles from the territory of the States to which they are available, and they are essentially and not geographically meant for offensive, aggressive action, for suppressing other nations and influencing various States." (ibid.)

Whether that be so or not, the point is that they would all be eliminated under the United States wording just as much as they would under the Soviet proposals.

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I would point out to our Soviet colleague that there is here in any case another point of view which has been put; it was put by Mr. Edberg, the representative of Sweden, on 11 May when he said:

"... it may be asked whether some national military bases in one country could not be regarded as equally menacing to the security of a neighbouring country." (ENDC/PV.35, p.35)

Therefore it is quite clear that there are others, not only allies of the United States, who feel that in fact this is not a definition which necessarily implies the only type of aggressive military base, and that there can be plenty of others which for geographical reasons rather than for reasons of ownership in foreign territories justify this concern. In any case, however, my point is that the argument is academic, because the wording in single brackets in paragraph 2 (a) clearly indicates that all bases are to be dismantled. In fact, if one wanted to make it clearer I suggest that where the words in brackets say "including bases wherever they might be located", one could insert the word "all" — "including all bases wherever they might be located". On that point there should be, I should have thought, no difficulty at all.

Our Soviet colleague had a great deal to say, in regard to article 1, paragraph 2 (b), about the words in double brackets "prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction". On 1 June he said:

"It is, however, clear to everyone that the prohibition of nuclear weapons as such and the prohibition of their manufacture are two different things. Prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons does not by any means prevent their retention from existing stockpiles or their use." (ENDC/PV.47, p.31)

He was seeking there to claim that the words which would be included if the United States draft were accepted would not cover the matter. Why would they not? I invite my colleagues to omit the words in double brackets but bring into the picture the words in single brackets. What does one get? One gets "elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction; cessation of the production and prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons". One would commit oneself to eliminate all stockpiles, to cease production and to prohibit manufacture. If all these three things are done, then the arguments which our Soviet colleague used on Friday seem to me to be illusory. If manufacture is prohibited, production is ceased and stockpiles are eliminated, what is left? It seems to me that his arguments in this regard do not carry conviction in the slightest degree.

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Incidentally, I was interested to see that on 1 June the Soviet representative did me the honour of referring to me (ENL /PV.47, p.31) and he said that I exclaimed "pathetically" -- I draw my colleagues' attention to that word -- that we in the West are very anxious to eliminate these weapons. I may be pathetic at times -- possibly listening to my Soviet colleague makes me feel a little pathetic -- but I am sorry if that is how I sounded on that occasion. I would assure Mr. Zorin that there was nothing pathetic in my thoughts in regard to this. I looked up my actual words, since I am sometimes accused by someone of quoting a little out of context. Perhaps I could remind the Conference that I said on that occasion, referring to something Mr. Zorin himself had said:

"I thought these were very damaging statements to make, indeed.

I would say that there is not a shadow of justification for them, and they do little good to our Conference. We in the West are very anxious indeed to eliminate these weapons. We are also anxious to know that others have eliminated theirs at the same time."

(ENDC/PV.45, p.44)

I would suggest that those words might well have been quoted at the same time as the preceding sentence, because they do show the concern which we in the West have in this matter. I have mentioned this only because of the interesting expression that our Soviet colleague used in regard to what I had said on that occasion.

An interesting point to me is the Soviet request, in regard to article 1, paragraph 2 (g) (Discontinuance of all military expenditures), to add the words "whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals". I certainly find this rather puzzling, and even after Mr. Zorin's explanation the other day I am still by no means clear in regard to it. In any case, discontinuance of all military expenditures would include other things in addition to State budgets. The word "all", I would have thought, was all-embracing. Unless our Soviet colleague can give us far clearer examples of what he fears in this regard, I would not think this is an important matter.

I do not wish to dwell on the other points of difference, except to comment on our Soviet colleague's insistence on including in article 1, paragraph 3, the reference to all three existing groups of States. I was rather surprised to see that, because I thought it had been made clear at this Conference by some of those who do not belong to either of the existing military groups that they did not like being lumped together as a group. I would have thought that it would be far better if the Soviet Union were willing to remove such words as these, which clearly are not

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acceptable to some of the delegations concerned. I make no comment about the whole reference to the international disarmament organization: this is a question we have to debate more fully, and I think it is premature to make any detailed comments in relation to it at the present time.

I would just refer to article 3, paragraph 3. I am interested to see the words that are not in brackets, "To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, States would support and provide .... agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force". This encourages me, because up till now I had understood that our Soviet colleagues had not been so keen on the use of the words "peace force". I am gratified to see that they have come forward in this regard. I will not dwell on the points of difference in this article at the present time because this is another matter which we have not discussed at very great length, and I would like to develop it in a full speech on a later occasion.

Those were the main comments I wished to make; but I would also state, having said one or two things a little sharply to our Soviet colleague, that I do realise that both our co-Chairmen have put in a lot of time in producing this draft and I realise the difficulty that exists in this regard. The fact that there are a large number of points of difference still outstanding is not a matter of surprise for any of us, I hope it will not be too much of a discouragement, because we should use it as a spur rather than a discouragement.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Today we have heard the statement -- which has also been published -- made by the Soviet representative on behalf of his Government, concerning the nuclear tests which the United States is preparing to make in outer space -- tests which are certainly dangerous for all mankind and in particular for certain human activities in certain regions.

We really find it most surprising that, at the very time when the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is in session, the United States, with the assistance of its allies, should be carrying out such tests, which may cause disturbances in the ionosphere and thus have consequences which are incalculable and, according to the scientists, unpredictable for a large proportion of the activities of the world today.

This intention of the United States to carry out nuclear tests in the ionosphere in order to see precisely what effect they will have and to create disturbances in the ionosphere has been condemned by many scientists all over the world, as the Soviet representative pointed out. This United States project



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has also been discussed by many scientists in the United States and the United Kingdom. I have before me the statement made on this matter by one of the greatest English scientists, to which the Soviet representative has already made a brief reference. To show what these tests mean, however, I should like to read out certain parts of this statement, which was made by the English astronomer Bernard Lovell, and reproduced in the newspaper "Le Monde" on 31 May 1962:

"This is a black moment for humanity and an affront to the civilized world."

And later he says:

"The United States is acting unilaterally against the opinion of those who are still free to speak in the international community and with the greatest contempt for the grave moral questions this decision entails. The much vaunted devotion of the United States to the peaceful uses of space will now be regarded as a veil which may be torn aside at the request of the American militarists and the scientists attached to them."\*

Thus the recent discussions in scientific circles have brought condemnation by a large proportion of the world's scientists.

Moreover, the United States representative, in attempting to reply to the statement read by the Soviet delegation, said that it was cynical on the part of the Soviet Union and its representative in this Committee to protest against such an undertaking by the United States. This statement makes a strange impression. Those who began atomic tests, those who tried them on human beings, are now saying that others are cynical because they continued these tests in order to make provision for their defence. The very people who are now beginning nuclear tests in the ionosphere, whereas up to now there had been no tests in outer space, say that the protest made by those who are willing to negotiate on the peaceful uses of outer space is cynicism. If that is so, one no longer knows what cynicism is. I think that cynicism is rather when, in the present situation of the world, a certain government, in this case the United States Government, undertakes an act which may have incalculable consequences for the future of mankind.

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\* Translated from French; no English text available.

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That is all I wished to say about the statement made by the Soviet representative on the American nuclear tests in outer space and the reply by the United States representative.

I now wish to raise certain questions connected more particularly with the atmosphere that will have to be created if the discussions and the work of our Conference are not to be disturbed by irrelevant statements having no connexion with the task entrusted to us. I should also like to speak about a question of prime importance for the creation of an atmosphere of trust between States, which is so necessary, as several speakers have said, for the successful conclusion of our work, in particular, the question of foreign military bases on which the United Kingdom representative dwelt at some length -- rightly I think, although I do not accept his arguments.

In his statement of 30 May, Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States -- who unfortunately is not here when I am raising questions that concern him --, replying to various questions put by the delegation of the United Arab Republic, (ENDC/PV.40, pp.13 et seq.), made some statements which are really astonishing in a Committee called upon to discuss disarmament and to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In a reply to the third question put by Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, the United States representative indulged in what might be called unprecedented war propaganda (ENDC/PV.45, pp.6 et seq.). Of course, it is quite understandable that if Mr. Dean intended to use the floor of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for war propaganda, he was not particularly surprised on the previous day, that is to say on 29 May, to find that the Soviet delegation to our Conference had been instructed by its Government to ask (ENDC/PV.44, pp.5 et seq; ENDC/39) that certain provisions more mandatory in form and character be included in the Declaration against War Propaganda (ENDC/C.1/20) that our Conference discussed on that day.

These statements by the United States representative in praise of United States military power -- statements which, moreover, are consistent with the activities and the policy of the United States in preparation for war and its policy of threatening war and aggression -- would really not be surprising if they had not been made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. What is surprising in this particular case, is the fact that Mr. Dean, and through him the United States, thought fit to choose the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as an audience for statements in which they seek to show their military power. Perhaps they thought that some delegations here could be easily influenced by such a

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demonstration of power not to support the proposals submitted for effective, general and complete disarmament.

I must say that this reply was perhaps given in a tone which did not make a very great impression, because it was well chosen. Nevertheless, the statements were made with just that intention. For it is well known -- and if it was not well known before, the United States representative took care to demonstrate the fact quite clearly in his replies to the questions put to him -- that the United States is not interested in general and complete disarmament, but in retaining its "second-strike capability", and in preserving the strength of the other components of its military power. To put it plainly, the United States intends to continue its policy of the threat of force and the balance of terror.

However, the world has already become accustomed to appraising such statements more objectively and calmly and considering them in the light of all the changes which have occurred in the balance of forces in recent years, during which the forces of peace have grown so much that they are now superior to the forces of war. The forces of peace have increased to such an extent that, effectively organized, they are now in a position to prevent not only the outbreak of war, but also demonstrations of force -- such as those which have been made -- with the object of psychological and moral preparation for war, and at the same time to frustrate any attempted threat of the use of force in international relations. In these circumstances we are sure Mr. Dean's statements will not have the expected effect on the audience to which they were addressed.

It was at the meeting at which those statements were made that we intended to speak and draw the attention of delegations to the extraordinary manner in which the United States was acting at a Conference on general and complete disarmament. But we did not have the prepared text of Mr. Dean's speech, for, as we have already pointed out, it contained, in the form of replies statements intended to show, not the United States' desire to achieve general and complete disarmament, but the destructive military power of that country.

What was the question by Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, to which Mr. Dean was replying? He condensed it, as he said himself, as follows:

"Because of numerical differences in each side's inventory of delivery vehicles, might not a level of 70 per cent retained arms at the end of stage I of the United States treaty outline aggravate imbalance by accenting differences near the dangerous minimum safety line or second-strike capability?" (ENDC/PV.45, p.5).

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Mr. Dean then said that, after very serious consideration of the question by the United States and thorough studies by various panels of the ablest experts in the United States, it had been concluded that the Soviet Union does not at present possess the first-strike capability to destroy the United States. Mr. Dean continued:

"However, our best present estimate is that while the Soviet Union, if it so wished, could in a nuclear exchange cause the gravest damage to the United States and its population, the Soviet Union does not possess at this time either the first or the second-strike capability to destroy the United States." (ibid., p.7)

The United States representative therefore thought it necessary to repeat and strongly emphasize the assertion that the Soviet Union was not capable of destroying the United States, and attempted to show, by explanations relating to the question put to him, that the United States was capable of destroying the Soviet Union, not only by a first strike, but even by a second strike. In speaking of the destructive power of the United States, Mr. Dean took care to present it as if the United States were capable of doing that. This assertion takes on a very special character if we refer to what the United States representative said with regard to American striking power:

"Thus, in the first stage the United States would not be prepared to go beyond the point which would jeopardize either its second-strike capability - I emphasize 'second-strike capability' ..." (ibid., p.6).

Moreover, if we refer to the statements of United States military experts, generals and even responsible politicians, made on various occasions to show off the military power of the United States for propaganda purposes, we find the same assertions, including the claim that the United States is capable of destroying the Soviet Union and its allies not only by a first strike but also by a second strike.

I do not intend at this stage to discuss whether the United States has or has not the capacity or the ability to destroy the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries by its nuclear striking power. We think that experts with more knowledge of the subject might study the question and throw as much light on it as possible. But I do wish to stress that in a Conference concerned with drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament, statements such as we have heard are entirely out of place. For it was not a matter of answering a question about the capacity of the United States to destroy a supposed enemy, but a question directly concerned with disarmament. We hope that in future there will be no more of these statements intended to impress the members of the Committee and, perhaps, world opinion, with

the military power of the United States and, consequently, its power of destruction. Statements of this kind are, I repeat, entirely out of place.

I should now like to turn to another question: that of foreign military bases, which has also been discussed today.

In the discussions on the first stage of general and complete disarmament, and in the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty submitted to the Conference by the United States and the Soviet Union, the question of foreign bases occupied an important position, together with the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This is perfectly understandable, since the question of foreign military bases is not only closely and indissolubly linked with the other problems of disarmament, in particular with that of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but is also particularly important in connexion with the question of creating an atmosphere of good neighbourliness and trust between States, in which it would be easier to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. I think that it was in this spirit — and perhaps for these reasons — that the United Kingdom representative today endeavoured to give a clear explanation of his position on this matter.

In the provisions proposed by the United States in the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty, it attempted to assimilate foreign military bases to national bases. As I have said, an attempt to do this was also made today by the United Kingdom representative. Article 1, paragraph 2 (a), for instance, is so drafted as to include military bases in the problem of disbanding all armed forces and dismantling military establishments, "including bases wherever they might be located." The words "wherever they might be located" are an attempt to dispose of the problem of military bases which, together with and parallel to other important questions, is the source of the present international tension in relations between States. Hence this problem of foreign military bases is of vital importance in relations between States, particularly in regions where such bases exist.

The tendency to minimize the importance of foreign military bases and assimilate them to national bases, has long been evident in the interventions and statements of the representatives and statesmen of the Western countries. It must be pointed out, however, that no matter what the Western representatives, and particularly the representative of the United States, have done to avoid this question of foreign military bases in their latest statements, it is becoming more and more important. In his replies to the questions put by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Dean, making the best of a bad job, sought to present the situation as though that representative had accepted the reasons for the Western countries' position on the question of foreign military bases and, in particular,

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certain factors such as time and space factors and others relating to an alleged equivalence. One cannot help being astonished at the extraordinary skill with which Mr. Dean tried to present the situation as though the representative of the United Arab Republic, in putting his questions on foreign military bases, had admitted and even endorsed the alleged necessity of retaining those bases, or at least of tolerating them. But the truth is quite the contrary.

Speaking of the three vast oceans and the vast air space separating the United States from its bases -- for it is an incontrovertible fact that the American bases are tens of thousands of kilometres from the national territory of the United States and represent a danger to the countries and the peoples of the countries in which they are situated because they were established for offensive military action against supposed enemies -- Mr. Dean went on:

"Therefore, the time and space factors mentioned by the representative of the United Arab Republic are of vital importance in the defence arrangements of the Western Alliance." (ENDC/PV.45, p.8)

I do not wish to dwell on the reasons why these foreign bases should be eliminated at the same time as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Those reasons have already been aptly stated by the Soviet representative in his many statements to this Conference -- and by other representatives of the socialist countries -- and again quite recently when he spoke on the working draft of Part I of the treaty. I wish to speak rather of the attempt made by certain representatives of the Western countries to assimilate foreign military bases to national bases. Efforts have been made to show that with the proportional reduction of vehicle launching pads and of all other kinds of armament, national bases would disappear together with, to quote Mr. Dean, "the so-called foreign bases." (ibid., p. 7) The United States representative added: "As members know, these foreign bases exist by treaty or other arrangements worked out with the country where the bases are located." (ibid., p.8)

This is supposed to show that foreign military bases and national bases can be given a common denominator. Now it is obvious to any unprejudiced observer that foreign military bases are entirely different from national bases. There is no need to stress the fact that their very name -- "foreign military bases" -- shows how much they differ in kind from national bases. I should like in particular to stress certain important characteristics which give a sufficiently clear idea of the total difference between national military bases and foreign military bases as regards their nature. What, in fact, is the significance of the foreign military bases situated along the frontiers of certain countries and directed against those countries?

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They are points at which are stationed foreign troops commanded by foreign officers, who receive their orders from their respective governments, which are not the governments of the countries on whose territory the bases are situated. There is no doubt that the foreign troops and foreign officers stationed at these bases are sent to the area in question to apply and put into effect the policy of the government which sent them, not the policy of the government of the country in which they are stationed.

It can, of course, be replied that these bases are established in order to carry out a policy common to the country in which they are situated and the country to which they belong; and we shall be told that this meets joint defence requirements. Nevertheless the fact is that it often happens -- indeed very often -- that the policy and interests of the country permitting the establishment of a base and those of the country which established it are not the same -- they are not always in harmony. There have been many examples. It may happen that the country in which a base is established has a vital interest in improving its relations with the neighbouring countries, whereas the interests and policy of the government which established the base are not the same at that moment. In these circumstances, the foreign military base does not serve to provide a common defence, but rather to frustrate the policy of improving relations between the country in which the base is situated and the neighbouring country or countries against which the base is directed. It also happens that the country to which the base belongs is not really opposed to the improvement of relations between the country in which the base is situated and its neighbours, but that its very interest in retaining the base does not allow it to encourage an understanding between the countries in question or at least does not facilitate its doing so.

In fact, a government which has military bases established along the frontiers of a foreign country and directed against it is always wondering what would happen to those bases if relations between the two neighbouring countries improved and became friendly. Having lost their raison d'être because of the improvement in relations between those countries, the bases would have to be abandoned. There would be no justification for them. But has there ever yet been a government of a military significant country (except, of course, the Soviet Union, which immediately

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after the war withdrew its bases from certain countries in which they had been established) which showed the intention, the desire and the will to withdraw the military bases it had established in foreign territory, and to do so of its own accord? Up to the present, no such cases, no such acts, are known to history, with the exception, of course, of the Soviet Union, as I have just said.

It is the contrary that is true, and examples abound all over the world. The United States base at Guantanamo is a striking example of the determination of a militarily significant country to hold a base in foreign territory -- in the territory of Cuba -- despite the changes in the situation and the unanimous desire of the Cuban people to see that base withdrawn. There is also the example of the foreign military bases in Morocco. There are bases in Tunisia and in other Arab countries in the Middle East and Near East -- bases which are maintained against the declared wishes and policy of the governments of the countries concerned to see them withdrawn from their national territory. The interests of those foreign bases are such that, even when there is no need whatever to use them for preparing action against the countries against which they are directed, their mere existence at specific points and the alleged necessity of prolonging it, from the point of view of the country to which they belong, leads to a worsening of relations between the neighbouring countries of the region.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, which has the greatest number of foreign bases along its frontiers in relation to the size of its national territory -- bases directed against its national security -- is particularly interested in the elimination of foreign military bases on its own frontiers and all over the world. We are certain that this would make it possible to create the necessary conditions for improving relations between our country and the neighbouring countries where these bases are established. Bulgaria is the immediate neighbour of two countries which belong to the North Atlantic Alliance, although, of course, they are very far from being Atlantic countries. It should be noted that there are several American bases in their territory which have several times been used on different occasions to serve the military ends of that Alliance or of the different countries forming it.



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It will be remembered, for instance, that during the Suez crisis certain bases in the Mediterranean and in countries adjoining Bulgaria were the centre of feverish activity directed against the interests of the Egyptian people and of the Arab world in general. During the intervention in Lebanon by the United States (and I should say, in certain cases, by the United Kingdom) and the preparation for the intervention in Syria, which took place in 1956 and 1957 respectively, some of these bases were used as starting points or support points for the military operations undertaken. Even now, these foreign military bases are used to mount joint military manoeuvres by the NATO countries, particularly the United States, in order to prepare for any future action they may be called upon to take against our country and its security.

In these circumstances it is hardly necessary to stress the great interest of Bulgaria in the implementation of the provisions on dismantling military bases in foreign territory contained in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, and in the specific obligation -- I repeat, specific obligation -- to dismantle foreign military bases, embodied in Part I of that treaty, to which the United States should subscribe.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We have heard this morning a variety of statements which, unfortunately, fall within the province of the "cold war" rather than within the confines, broad as they are, of the serious work of this Committee on Disarmament. But we have also heard, fortunately, statements designed to help us in clarifying our thinking and to assist us in our negotiations. The United States delegation will study the statements in this second category with the care and attention they deserve.

In our Committee's discussions the United States delegation has elaborated various elements contained in stages I and II of the United States Outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30). Today I wish to discuss the subject of military expenditures as it relates to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; Part I, as submitted by the co-Chairmen to the Conference; and the United States draft treaty outline. This subject has already been raised and some excellent points on it have been made by the representative of Nigeria. I am hopeful that he will find in my remarks at least a tentative and partial answer to some of the questions he raised.

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations provides basic guide-lines on this problem. Numbered paragraph 3(e) of that statement reads as follows:

"... the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for ...

"(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures." (ENDC/5, page 2)

The United States outline makes an initial reference to this matter in its paragraph A 2 (e), which states as an objective the "Discontinuance of military expenditures". Part I of the draft treaty (ENDC/40/Rev.1), which was submitted to the Conference by the co-Chairmen last week, provides in its article 1, paragraph 2(g), in its agreed language, for "discontinuance of all military expenditures". The United States outline, in paragraph B 4, gives us some indication of how savings resulting from disarmament might be used. That paragraph states that, as national armaments were reduced, the United Nations would be strengthened in order, among other things:

"to facilitate the development of international co-operation common tasks for the benefit of mankind." (ENDC/30, page 3).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

There are two substantive provisions relating to military expenditures in the United States outline; these are on page 11. The first provision calls for periodic submissions by the parties to the treaty to the international disarmament organization of a report on their military expenditures at the end of each step of each of the three stages. The second provision deals with the verifiable reduction of expenditures and calls on the parties to the treaty to agree to examine questions related thereto and to consider, in the light of this examination, appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

In discussing the various elements relating to military expenditures, I propose to divide my remarks into three main topics. These are: first, the use of limitations on military expenditures as a substantive arms reduction measure; second, the use of information concerning military expenditures as one technique for verification of arms reduction; and third, the use of the resources released by the reduction of military expenditures resulting from disarmament.

Let me deal first with the question of a limitation on military expenditures as a substantive arms reduction measure. We believe that there is some possibility that such a measure might prove to be useful in helping achieve our disarmament objectives. But the technical problems which it obviously involves will require our careful study before we can determine whether and how useful it might be.

The reduction of military expenditures is, of course, implicitly provided for, through the implementation of concrete measures of disarmament. For if we are in fact disarming, and if the production of armaments is drastically reduced and finally halted, the major purpose of such expenditures will gradually, and in the end completely, fade away. Thus the United States views the limitation of military expenditures as an inevitable product of the disarmament process which it has proposed, that is, as one of the end results -- and indeed a most favourable one -- of the transition to a disarmed world.

There is some question, however, of the feasibility of specific limitation on military expenditures as a substantive disarmament measure. This is particularly so, it seems to us, if such a limitation is conceived as an independent initial step. Our initial reaction is that, in the early stages of disarmament, budgetary limitations are a derivative of physical measures of disarmament, but not in themselves a useful means of bringing disarmament about.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Budgetary limitation has figured prominently in past disarmament proposals. It has been a frequent subject of debate, but not since 1933, so far as we are aware, has it been a subject of concerted international study by budgetary and fiscal experts. For our part, we are prepared to participate in the necessary expert study of this problem at an appropriate time during the meetings of this Committee, at a time when some of the technical aspects of other measures can also be studied.

The representative of Sweden will remember that her Government recommended a technical study of this problem in the debate of the First Committee at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958 during the consideration of a Soviet draft resolution calling for an unverified reduction of military expenditures. In First Committee debates of subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, Sweden again recommended expert study groups for technical questions, without however mentioning budgetary matters in particular. Mr. Edberg did so, for example at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, at the 1203rd meeting of the First Committee.

The need for international study of this problem, as part of the expert study of verification suggested by the representative of Brazil, is clear. The extremely diverse national systems of budgeting do not readily lend themselves to comparability or to standardized definitions and procedures for control. Accounting differences develop out of the very different kinds of economic systems and even the most effective verification might not remove them.

To illustrate the problems that such a technical group should study, may I point out some of the differences between Soviet and Western methods of government finance which make for such lack of comparability? I believe a brief resumé of the differences in three important areas will adequately point up the problem. The areas we will discuss are: first the method of budgeting military expenditures; second the method of pricing military items; and third, the method of parliamentary control of expenditures.

Let us take the method of budgeting first. In this, allocations for defence purposes do not have the same meaning, we are advised, in Soviet and Western budgets. It has been Soviet practice, we are informed, to label as "defence" only a fraction of the national outlays actually used for defence purposes as the West would normally define "defence". Given this basic difference, there is little comparability between the gross totals for military expenditures reported by the Soviet Union and those reported by the United States and other Western nations.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We are informed that the published Soviet budget is ambiguous not only in totals but in details. The explicitly-identified defence expenditures are undefined and reduced to a single-line statement; the rest of the budget, it seems to us, is almost equally undefined and somewhat cryptic in character. There is in the Soviet Union no detailed public disclosure, as, for example, in the Congressional Committee hearings in the United States or in the 1200-page Federal Budget of the United States, which would make cross-checks possible.

The structure of Soviet accounting has varied over time, not only with normal changes in Soviet accounting practices but also, as seems to be the case with the increases publicized in 1961, with the emphasis which the Soviet Government desires to give to the size of the published total of military expenditures. These practices would hardly give assurance that reported allocations to defence would be an accurate guide in the future to changes in actual spending levels.

Secondly, turning to the differences in pricing, the Soviet cost system tends, we believe, to understate the cost of military items and hence to minimize the apparent share of the Soviet gross national product allocated to military purposes. Costs and prices in the Soviet Union are not determined by free market conditions as in the West. Price is a function not of competitive costs but of governmental decisions in consideration of broad economic and political plans. By the same token, it seems to us, the Soviet system would offer the possibility of manipulation through price reform or cost re-allocation if this proved desirable in order to avoid an imposed budgetary limitation.

Lastly, there is no effective parliamentary control of expenditure in the Soviet system similar to that existing in Western democracies. Without an opposition party and without an effective mechanism in the Supreme Soviet for public review of budgets, as the United States Congress has in its Committees, it seems to us, there is no built-in guarantee under the Soviet system that money appropriated will be spent for the purposes claimed.

The difficulties described above underline problems that would be associated with budgetary limitation as a substantive arms reduction measure and with verification of compliance with that measure itself. I believe that Mr. Atta had in mind the kinds of problems I have discussed when in his statement he said:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"It is conceded here, however, that a different form of verification may be necessary in accordance with each different economic and political system.

For example, a cut in the military expenditure in a democratic State implies an automatic cut in the production of war weapons in that State.

This may not necessarily mean the same in a State in which all the means of production are owned by the State." (ENDC/PV.31, page 7)

I have described some of the difficulties inherent in budgetary limitations in order to explain the doubts we have as to the merits of such a measure, at least in the early stages of disarmament. But, as I pointed out earlier, we do not wish to leave unexplored any measure that holds any promise at all in the field of disarmament. We are prepared, therefore, to participate in an international study of these problems.

Let me now turn briefly to my second main topic, the use of information concerning military expenditures as one technique for verification of arms reduction. We have been pessimistic about the feasibility of military expenditure reduction as a substantive measure of disarmament. We feel, however, that we can be more optimistic about the possibilities of utilizing military expenditures as one of the techniques for verification.

The United States Outline calls for the progressive institution of verification procedures to ensure compliance at all times with the obligations assumed under the treaty. We believe that effective verification will probably encompass a variety of processes and the use of many kinds of data. Among the data that we believe might be made relevant and useful are those bearing on military expenditures which might be obtained from the inspection of national accounts.

There are two possibilities which we can see in the use of budgets and expenditure records for verification purposes. One obvious use would be fiscal inspection to verify a limitation on military expenditures if such a limitation, after study, proved feasible. A second possibility might be fiscal inspection to complement and reinforce other measures of control. We feel that both of these uses should be studied and evaluated to determine how they can best be employed and how usefully they could contribute to verification of disarmament measures.

In making this suggestion the United States recognizes that verification appropriate to any given measure of disarmament need not proceed only through the physical object of control. For example, expenditures of scrutiny of an industry

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

like iron and steel, which provides an essential underpinning to an arms industry, might offer a supplementary means of verifying whether or not arms were being produced, though the industry itself would not be subject to limitation. Similarly, fiscal inspection might prove useful as a supplementary means of verifying compliance with measures of physical limitations, even though fiscal limitation itself was not feasible.

Now let me turn to the last of my three main topics in connexion with military expenditure: the use of resources released by disarmament.

On numerous occasions the United States Government has taken the position that the achievement of disarmament would present opportunities for enlarged assistance to less-developed countries. This has been a bi-partisan policy supported by both Democratic and Republican Administrations.

At the United Nations the United States has introduced resolutions in support of this policy and the General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on the subject. I refer particularly to resolution 724 (VIII) of the eighth session of the General Assembly in 1953, and also to resolution 914 (X) of 11 December 1955; resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957; and resolution 1252 (XIII) of 4 November 1958.

Most recently, Secretary Rusk referred to this problem in his first address to this Conference on 19 March (ENDC/PV.2, p.17). He pointed out that we must eliminate instruments of destruction, prevent the outbreak of war by accident or by design, and create the conditions for a secure and peaceful world. In so doing, as he pointed out, we can turn the momentum of science exclusively to peaceful purposes, and we can lift the burden of the arms race and thus increase our capacity to raise living standards everywhere. The Secretary then referred to the United Nations report on the economic and social consequence of disarmament, and emphasized that, in the spirit of that report, the United States would deal with economic readjustments required by broad and deep cuts in arms levels. He not only pointed out that disarmament would permit the United States to get on with the job of building a better America but also said that through expanded economic development activities we could get on with the job of helping to build a better world.

As you are all aware, we have in this Conference reached a large measure of agreement on a draft preamble. Two paragraphs of the preamble are particularly pertinent to the question of the use of resources released by disarmament. These paragraphs read:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring further economic and social progress in all countries in the world and ensuring that the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advancement;

"Convinced that the resources released by general and complete disarmament will enhance the capacity of states so disarmed to contribute to the economic and cultural development of all countries and peoples of the world and contribute to greater co-operation among them;".

(ENDC/L.11/Rev.1)

While the United States has thus clearly recognized the further impetus which disarmament would provide for economic development, we do not believe that it is possible at this time, in the absence of international agreement, to anticipate when disarmament would enable the United States Government to realize the savings which could be used for additional United States aid to other peoples. Nor is it, of course, now possible to commit Congressional action. However, the historical record of United States leadership in aiding the development of other countries provides valuable guidance in this regard.

I can assure you that the United States will in the future, as it has done in the past, respond imaginatively and constructively to opportunities for advancing the well-being of other countries as well as its own. It has not waited for agreement on disarmament to create the largest programme of aid for foreign economic development in the history of mankind. It has a record second to none in its support of the international pooling of resources for this purpose.

The United States welcomes the attention which the United Nations has given to the economic consequences of disarmament, and in its own planning is continuing to treat this as a priority subject for study. One of the major areas to which the United States is turning its attention is the many alternative uses, both at home and abroad, for the funds which disarmament will eventually release. As soon as practical disarmament steps can be taken, the United States expects to be in a position to make appropriate disposition of those resources which will be released in ways that will provide ever higher standards of living and benefits for all mankind.



The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I would draw my colleagues' attention to the fact that it is now fourteen minutes to 1 o'clock. I still have on my list three representatives who have expressed a wish to speak this morning, but it seems to me to be impossible to fit them all in. Possibly we could hear one more. I do not know what would be the length of the intervention of our next speaker, who is the representative of Romania. He indicates that he can fit his speech in this morning, and so I am very happy to call on him.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): With due respect to the Committee and to the health of its members, having in mind that there are only fourteen minutes to lunch-time, I would like to postpone my intervention until tomorrow morning, on the condition that then we deal with the same item.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Thank you very much. I think we should all commend our colleague from Romania. This is the second occasion when he has been left over. He agreed on Friday to allow his name to go forward, and he has done so again today. That is an example to the rest of us which I am sure we should all greatly applaud, and we are very grateful to him. That being so, I trust that our other colleagues who have their names down will also allow their names to go forward to the next occasion. It would scarcely be fair to allow someone else to speak now, when our Romanian colleague has made this gesture. Are there any comments on that? Does anyone else wish to make any comment? I notice that the representative of the Soviet Union has held up his hand, and I call upon him in the same spirit as that in which the last intervention was made.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I venture to speak merely in answer to the statements made today. I do not wish to deal in detail with all the statements which touched upon our position on a number of questions, but would merely like to make two brief comments.

The first concerns the position of the United States and the United Kingdom in connexion with the question we raised today when we read into the record the Statement of the Soviet Government on the United States tests in outer space. The United States representative, in reaction to this statement, went as far as to call it cynical and hypocritical, accused the Soviet Union of breaking its word in September last year, and held it responsible for all the consequences.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I venture to remind representatives, including the representative of the United States, that the United States in December 1959 was the first to state, in the declaration of its President, that it denounced the obligation not to carry out nuclear weapon tests. Therefore, if there is a question of who broke his word first, it was the President of the United States.

Secondly, what is taking place today is something new in comparison with what we have had so far. The United States is taking a new step in developing the nuclear arms race, by extending it into a new field - into outer space -; this is a very important and, politically, a very significant fact. The Soviet Government's act in now drawing attention to this cannot, it seems to me, be ignored either by our Committee or by the world. This is a new development in the nuclear arms race, an extension of this race into outer space. All the talk and verbiage put out on this matter in our Committee by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, saying that they wish to preserve outer space from nuclear arms, are now in fact completely contradicted by the actions of the United States.

I believe that every member of the Committee can now judge whose statements have been hypocritical, whose statements have been cynical, on this clear-cut question. What was said by the United Kingdom representative in this connexion, that the Soviet Union could conclude without delay an agreement on the discontinuance of tests, does not in my view require any further comment. We have already given our views on this new position, and the assessment by the United States and the United Kingdom of the compromise proposal of the eight non-aligned countries for the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests speaks for itself.

You propose to conclude an agreement on your terms. We propose to conclude an agreement on a compromise basis. This you reject. That is the core of your position. Therefore, to say that it is in our power to conclude an agreement now is, I likewise venture to say here, a hypocritical statement. You know full well that it is impossible to conclude an agreement on your conditions. This was recognized not only by us, but also by the eight non-aligned countries when they introduced their Memorandum. We propose that you should conclude an agreement on precisely this compromise basis. That is a practical possibility, it is feasible -- but you do not want it. The present act of the United States

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

in outer space confirm once again that you do not want any kind of an agreement. That is my first comment on this question.

My second comment concerns the approach which emerged during our debate at the previous meeting and no emerges in relation to nuclear weapons and their prohibition. The United Kingdom representative tried to prove today that in the co-Chairmen's Working Draft, article 1, sub-paragraph 2(b), the United States wording fully covers the question and there is no need for the wording proposed by the Soviet Union. I would remind you that the Soviet Union proposed to say clearly and definitely:

"Prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction." (ENDC/40, Rev.1, p.2)

while the United States proposes:

".... cessation of the production and prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons." (ibid.)

The United Kingdom representative attempted today, in defence of the United States draft, to show us that once all stocks of nuclear weapons had been destroyed and their production halted and prohibited, surely nothing else was required. But the United Kingdom representative knows perfectly well that the United States draft contains not only sub-paragraph (b) but also the introduction to paragraph (2). At the beginning of this paragraph in the United States text -- which we do not accept -- reads:

"Taking into account paragraph 1 above and the requirements of the United Nations Peace Force provided for below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for: ...." (ibid., p.1)

And then there are sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and so forth. What does this mean? I think the United Kingdom representative realizes perfectly well that, if the United States does not reject this phrase, it is highly important. And it really is highly important. It says:

"Taking into account ... the requirements of the United Nations Peace Force provided for below ..."

What are "the requirements .... provided for below"? We have proposed to insert in article 3, paragraph 3 -- to which you have drawn attention today --, after the words

"... agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of ...",

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

and before the word "armaments", one little word which you have not mentioned:

"((non-nuclear))" (ibid., p.5)

For some reason your ally the United States does not agree to include this word "non-nuclear". You have not mentioned this word today. In the light of that introduction to article 1, paragraph 2, the root of the matter becomes clear.

The United States wants the words:

"Taking into account paragraph 1 above and the requirements of the United Nations Peace Force provided for below ..." (ibid., p.1).

"Provided for below" refers to "equipped with agreed types of armaments"; but you do not want to accept "non-nuclear". Your position on this question is very simple. You advocate cessation of the production and even prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but you are acting in accordance with "the requirements of the United Nations Peace Force provided for below". And "provided for below" refers to agreed types of armaments which can and, as Mr. Dean has stated, most probably should include nuclear armaments. That is why you object to our phrase:

"Prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction;" (ibid., p.2)

If you favoured the prohibition of nuclear weapons, you would not oppose this phrase. But precisely because you oppose it, and precisely because you want the international force to be equipped with nuclear weapons, you object to our word "non-nuclear" (armaments) and also to our phrase "prohibition of nuclear weapons". That is the point at issue and you have no means of escape from it.

Your position is that you want to keep nuclear weapons till the very end of disarmament. That is your position. It is connected with your whole conception of nuclear deterrent forces. Therefore your present nuclear weapons tests in outer space are also linked with your conception of retaining a nuclear deterrent force during the whole forthcoming historical period, right up to the conclusion of the treaty on general and complete disarmament and even till the end of disarmament. That is your position concerning nuclear power and nuclear forces.

All your trivial observations and explanations are therefore worth nothing in face of these hard facts. These slight amendments which you propose signify an attempt to keep nuclear weapons till the very end of disarmament and to pass

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

them on -- which of course we will not have -- to the international force. That is why you oppose the prohibition of nuclear weapons in sub-paragraph 2 (b). Those are the two observations which I wanted to make.

As for Mr. Stelle's observations about budgetary questions today, I do not want to detain all the members of the Committee, but I am bound to say that his attempt to analyse the treatment of budgetary questions in the Soviet parliament will not stand the least criticism. I will not deal with this topic now, so as not to delay representatives at this late hour, but I will venture next time to give a detailed reply, and in passing to show why we favour sub-paragraph 2 (g):

"Discontinuance of all military expenditures" -- and we add -- "whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals".

(ENDC/40/Rev.1, page 2)

The United Kingdom representative has asked me today whether I cannot explain the issue here, and why we insist on this addition. I will do so willingly, and show what the issue is, and why we consider that private individuals and organizations in the capitalist world must be forbidden to finance military requirements and equip the various organizations and institutions which wage war on the quiet in a number of colonial territories. I think that the United Kingdom representative knows this perfectly well, because the United Kingdom has sufficient wealth of experience in this respect. But if he wants me to explain, I will do so with pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I had thought that in asking other representatives to defer their speeches today I had brought the discussion to a close. I did not realize that the representative of the Soviet Union wished to reopen certain matters. However, our United States colleague has now asked to exercise his right to reply.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): I would like to remind you that I postponed my intervention until tomorrow morning, having in mind the fact that it is our usual procedure to end meetings at 1 o'clock. I therefore think the United States representative should also postpone his reply until tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I do understand the feelings of the representative of Romania. I had gathered that the Soviet representative merely wished to make a very brief reply to something that had been said. It is unfortunate that the matter under discussion has now been raised again, and I do apologise to the representative of Romania for what has happened. I did not know what the Soviet representative was going to do.

I understand that on a point of order the United States representative wants to say a word or two. In the light of that, I hope the representative of Romania will think it reasonable for me, as Chairman, to allow a very short comment, on the understanding that he will speak first tomorrow morning.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The representative of Romania is certainly quite justified in suggesting the postponement of any reply since this is the second successive day in which he has kindly yielded and postponed his statement to the next day. But, for the second successive day, I fear my delegation must, on a point of order, make a very brief reply.

Mr. Zorin made three points. One was with regard to military expenditures, which he did not discuss and which I will not discuss. With regard to the question of nuclear weapons for the United Nations peace force, I shall merely repeat what I said on Friday. The United States Government and the United States delegation have taken no position as to whether or not the United Nations peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons. We believe that this is a question of considerable importance which must be discussed and thought through. But as of now we are taking no position for or against the equipment of the United Nations peace force with nuclear weapons. Mr. Zorin continues to say that because we say we will not take a position against, we are taking a position for. That is not the case.

Mr. Zorin revived an old argument. I am sorry we have to come back to it, but I think the record must against be set straight. It is quite true that in December 1959 the President of the United States stated that the United States was free from any continuing obligation not to test nuclear weapons, so long as there was not a treaty prohibiting such testing. The United States did not say it was going to test: it said it was free to test. It did not test. I submit that that was a completely honest course of action.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

After that statement by the President of the United States the Soviet Union continued to promise that it would not test in the absence of tests by the United States and the United Kingdom. Then the Soviet Union did test. That was the course of action which was not in keeping with the pledged word of the Soviet Union.

I hope that we shall not need to continue these old arguments further. My delegation is distressed at the fact that the statement of the Soviet Government read into our record today by the Soviet representative can serve only to revive these old arguments. The United States hopes for, and will work for, a sound treaty prohibiting for all time nuclear weapon tests in any environment.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): May I say, in my capacity as Chairman, that I have had a lot of trouble in the last few minutes with the representative of the United Kingdom, who badly wanted to speak? I have, however, refused to allow him to do so, and I hope that my firmness with him will discourage others from keeping us later this morning.

Before we pass to the communique, I would remind my colleagues that the representatives of Romania, India and Czechoslovakia are all inscribed to speak tomorrow, and we must see to it that our colleague from Romania does get his chance tomorrow.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-eighth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.B. Godber, Minister of State and representative of the United Kingdom.

"The representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 5 June 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

